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ABSTRACT
This paper traces developments from the inception of the 1988 Basel Accord to its present  
form (Basel II). In highlighting the flaws of the 1988 Accord, an evaluation is made of the  
Basel Committee’s efforts to address such weaknesses through Basel II. Whilst considerable  
progress has been achieved, the paper concludes on the basis of the principal aim of these  
Accords, that more work is still  required particularly in relation to hedge funds, liquidity  
risks,  and  those  risks  attributed  to  non  bank  financial  institutions.  Further,  the  paper  
highlights  existing  problems  with  Basel  II  through  a  reference  to  capital  measurement  
problems which were revealed in the aftermath of the Northern Rock crisis.
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Risk Management by the Basel Committee: Evaluating Progress made from the 1988 
Basel Accord to Recent Developments
The Role of Bank Supervisors in Maintaining Adequate Bank Capital
The importance of risk management derives from the objectives of financial regulation. The 
problem of systemic  risk constitutes  part  of the embodiment  of the rationale  for financial 
regulation.1 Regulators  impose  liquidity  monitoring  measures  on  banks  to  meet  specified 
minimum levels  of withdrawals.  However,  such measures  are precautionary against  short-
term cash flow problems rather than a situation of panic outburst.2 The level of confidence 
reposed in the public by the financial community is what sustains banks in modern times and 
this is strengthened by external checks which is given by credit agencies through scrutiny of 
published accounts and by bank regulation through prudential supervision.3
Prudential regulation however, is not the only way in which some regulators4 take interest in 
the financial management of authorised firms – there is also the principle of ensuring that a 
firm operates with required minimum level of capital in order to reduce the consequences of 
failure.5 As  a  result,  the  focus  on  the  solvency  and  safety  and  soundness  of  financial 
institutions and minimum capital requirement are often regarded as synonymous.6
High profile failures such as those of Franklin National Bank, Banco Ambrosiano,  BCCI, 
Barings and others have highlighted the need for effective consolidated supervision and close 
monitoring  of  activities  on  a  transnational  basis.7 Barings  focussed  on  multi  functional 
banking since it was fraud in the securities division which led to the collapse of the bank as a 
whole.  The  concept  of  ‘lead  regulation’  developed  independently  from  ‘consolidated 
supervision’ to manage the regulatory chain which was in place to supervise multi-authorised 
groups of institutions across various business forms.8 It originated from the 1986 ‘Big Bang’ 
and the introduction of the Financial Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987 for the 
purposes  of  prudential  regulation  of  diversified  financial  groups.9 The  issue  relating  to 
Barings as well as highlighting the problems and gaps which existed with prudential banking 
supervision,  poor regulation and supervision of multi  function firms10 also highlighted the 
misleading problem of relying on the capital adequacy ratio as the sole source of determining 
a financial institution's well-being.
1  The other constituent being the problem of asymmetric information. Speech by Howard Davies, former 
chairman , Financial Services Authority 'Building the FSA – Progress to Date and Priorities Ahead' 
Wednesday 30 September 1998 <http:// www.fsa.gov.uk> ( last visited 10 May 2009)
2 S Gleeson, Prudential Regulation of Banks under the FSMA chapter 10 in  A Practitioner's Guide to the FSA 
Regulation of Banking  J  Tattersall (ed)  second edition  (2006) 181
3 ibid
4   Such as the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA)
5 S Gleeson, Prudential Regulation of Banks under the FSMA  page 181
6 ibid
7 D Singh, Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (2007) Ashgate at p 103
8 ibid p 106
9 ibid
10  Bank and securities regulation
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Capital Adequacy
Capital  adequacy  constitutes  one  of  the  foundations  of  prudential  supervision.11 In  most 
countries there are minimum capital  requirements for the establishment of new banks and 
capital  adequacy tests  are  a  regular  element  in  ongoing supervision.12 In  the  consultative 
package “The New Basel Capital Accord” issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, 
the Basel Committee proposed a capital adequacy framework based on three complementary 
pillars: minimum capital requirements, a supervisory review process and market discipline. 
Capital adequacy is a term used to describe the adequacy of a bank’s aggregate capital in 
relation to the risks which arise from its assets, its off balance sheet transactions, its dealing 
operations and all other risks associated with its business.13
The aim is for a bank to have enough capital in relation to its risks to absorb the highest 
foreseeable  amount  of  loss  and still  give  allowance  in  which to  realise  assets,  raise  new 
capital or arrange for disposition of its business.14
Statutory requirements govern the minimum amount of capital  which a bank must have.15 
These have been established by UK and European legislation and from internationally agreed 
recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.16 In the UK, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA)’s approach to the calculation of the capital  base and the capital 
ratios and the assessment of capital adequacy are set out in chapters of the FSA’s Interim 
Prudential Sourcebook for Banks (IPRU (BANK))17. This was supplemented by the FSA’s 
policy  statement  “Individual  Capital  Ratios  for  Banks”.  This  has  been  replaced  by  the 
Integrated  Prudential  Sourcebook.18 In  addition,  at  the  international  level,  the  Basel 
Committee has issued far-reaching proposals to refine and develop the current approach.
 
According to the drafters of the Basel Core Principles, “Banking, by its nature, entails a wide 
array of risks. Banking supervisors need to understand these risks and be satisfied that banks 
are adequately measuring and managing them.”19 The Core Principles attempt to address the 
main risks encountered by banks in Principle Six which states that banking supervisors should 
set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements for all banks.20 Capital is 
very vital  in its role as it  contains risk in a banking firm, protects  deposits and equalises 
competition amongst banks.21During the early 1980s, increasing international competition and 
11The Relationship between Banking Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors' Jan 2002 para 33 page 9 see 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf> (last visited 1st November 2010)
12 ibid
13 J Hitchins, M Hogg  and  D Mallet,   Banking : A  Regulatory  Accounting  and  Auditing  Guide  Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (2001) 163
14 ibid
15 ibid
16 ibid
17 ibid; also see < http://www.basel-ii-risk.com/Integrated-Prudential-Sourcebook/index.htm> 
18 see < http://www.basel-ii-risk.com/Integrated-Prudential-Sourcebook/index.htm> The Prudential Sourcebook 
integrates prudential requirements for banks, building societies, investment firms, and insurers, including 
directive friendly societies. These requirements incorporated the Basel II credit risk standards which were 
due for implementation in 2006. A consequence of the Integrated Prudential Source book is that capital held 
in a financial firm will be more aligned to the risk of the business they write.
19 D Quiroz Rendon, ' The Formal Regulatory Approach to Banking Regulation' Badell & Grau Legal 
Consultants (2007) <http://www.badellgrau.com>
20 ibid pp 10,11
21 ibid
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losses on loans resulted in concerns about decreased capital levels in international banks22. 
This instigated consultations between the Basel Committees and supervisory authorities in 
order to establish a common approach to capital measurements and standards for banks.23
However, these capital measurements were usually, but not always, determined by banking 
supervisors  based  on  disclosed  items  in  the  balance  sheet  which  had  been  apportioned 
according to judgements concerning their underlying risks.24 The complaints which resulted 
from this mode of calculation related not only to its arbitrary nature, but also to the fact that it 
did  not  discriminate  adequately  between  risk  profiles  of  specific  banks  or  between  risks 
within  a  single  bank.25 Furthermore,  some  banks  felt  that  they  were  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage as a result of the regulation.26 The ensuing section discusses measures developed 
by the Basel Committee to address the flaws inherent in the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. These 
measures  were  developed  with  the  consideration  for  the  first  time,  of  the  calculation  of 
regulatory capital  partly  based on the risk models  and  systems  of  the  individual  banks.27 
However,  as the following section will  also reveal,  criticisms  still  emanate  from the new 
framework (Basel II).
Proposals to Update the Basel Capital Framework28
The problem with the Basel Accord was that it rewarded risky lending since it required banks 
to set aside the same amount of capital against loans to shaky borrowers as against those with 
better credits.29 Apart from the fact that capital requirements were just reasonably related to a 
bank’s risk taking,  the credit  exposure requirement  was the same regardless  of the credit 
rating  of  the  borrower.30 Furthermore,  the  capital  requirement  for  credit  exposure  often 
depended on the exposure’s legal form – for instance, an on-balance sheet loan was generally 
subject to a higher capital requirement than that of an off-balance sheet  to the same borrower, 
even though such differentiation could be insignificant owing to financial engineering.31 The 
subjectivity  revolving  round  such  requirements  provided  loopholes  whereby  banks  could 
manipulate decisions in such a way as to attain the minimal level of capital requirement – 
without justification for a corresponding level of risk-related activities being undertaken by 
the banks. As well as insensitivity to risk – attributing from the fact  that  Basel I was not 
responsive  and  did  not  adapt  easily  to  new  banking  activities  and  risk  management 
techniques, another problem which resulted from Basel I was the reluctance of banks to invest 
in better risk management systems.32 Given this insensitivity to risk, it is not only difficult to 
see  how  regulators  are  able  to  gauge  accurately  the  level  of  risk  inherent  in  activities 
22 ibid
23 Ibid; Results of the consultations were formally incorporated in the Basel Accord in 1988 and later included 
within the Core Principles; ibid.
24  See M Power, ‘The Invention of Operational Risk’ (2003) ESRC Centre for Analysis & Risk & Regulation 
LSE Discussion Paper No.16/June 2003
25  ibid at page 5
26  ibid; These banks considered their risk management processes to be effective and that too much capital was 
being required by the regulation.
27  ibid
28 J Hitchins, M Hogg  and  D Mallet,   Banking: A  Regulatory  Accounting  and  Auditing  Guide   ( Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 2001)  195
29  “Basle bust”  The Economist  April 13th 2000 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=332561>
30  M Saidenberg and T Schuermann, ‘The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research’ (2003) 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4
31  ibid
32  ibid page 5
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undertaken  by  the  bank,  it  would  also  complicate  the  task  of  alleviating  the  problem of 
systemic risk – one of the two principal objectives of financial regulation. 
In January 2001, the Basel  Committee published revised and updated drafts  of its  earlier 
proposals in June 1999 to reform the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. A revised framework known 
as  Basel  II  consists  of  three  pillars  namely:  capital  adequacy  requirements,  centralized 
supervision and market discipline and these pillars constitute the basis of the reform of the 
Basel Accord.33 As well as linking capital to credit ratings by agencies such as Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's, banks' internal credit-ratings are also to be used as determinants of how 
much capital they should set aside.34  Basel II aims to improve measures of capital adequacy 
(Pillar  1),  promote  greater  risk  management  practices  whereby  banks  are  required  to 
continually assess internal risks relative to capital (through Pillar 2)particularly with regards 
to credit risk. The reforms also aim to develop the Accord into a more universal framework 
for use by national banking supervisors.
On the 15th November 2005, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued an updated 
version  of  Basel  II  (updated  version  of  the  International  Convergence  of  Capital 
Measurements and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework) and also an updated version of 
the  Capital Accord to incorporate market risks.35 A “post-Enron” directive had been passed in 
2002.36 The  directive  aims  towards  a  more  effective  oversight  of  financial  groups  which 
combine banking, insurance and other activities which had not been adequately covered and 
accounted for by the EU regulation in operation at that time.37 As well as its main aim being 
the reduction of risk, it aims to ensure adequate capitalisation of financial conglomerates by 
banning practices which inflate a firm's capital base.38 The deadline for implementation of the 
directive was January 2005.39 
Pillar One is based on more risk-sensitive capital requirements.  While the definition of 
capital and the minimum capital coefficient of 8% are to remain unchanged, the existing risk 
categories of credit risk and market risk have been supplemented by a third risk category, 
namely, operational risk.40 This will have to be corroborated by capital.
In response to the deficiency of Basel 1, and given the fact that the measurement of minimum 
capital requirements is based on a general assessment of risk dispersion in the banking sector 
which  does  not  correspond  in  every  case  to  the  specific  circumstances  of  individual 
institutions, credit institutions will be required to retain more capital than that stipulated for 
the minimum capital requirements if their individual risk situation so demands.41 
33 See  JP  Decamps, JC Rochet  and R Benoit,  'The Three Pillars of Basel II : Optimizing the Mix in a 
continuous time Model' April 2002 <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/b2earoc.pdf> (last visited 1st November 
2010 )
34 “Basle bust”  The Economist  April 13th 2000 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=332561>
35 See <http:www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm>  (last visited  24th  May 2009)
36 “A bit of give and take “  The Economist  October 17th 2002 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=1397037>
37 ibid
38 ibid
39 ibid
40  Deutsche Bundesbank,”Basel II” 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule1.en.php> (last visited 1st 
November 2010)
41  ibid
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In addition to adapting to market developments, the revision of regulatory capital also aims to 
consider  risk  differentiation  at  the  individual  banks.42 Standard  and  advanced  risk 
measurement methods should provide banks with an incentive to continuously refine their 
internal risk management methodologies within the various risk categories.43
Pillar  Two namely supervisory review consists  of four principles.44 Principle  1 states that 
banks should have a means of determining their overall capital adequacy in relation to their 
risk profile and also a plan for sustaining their capital levels and that these processes require 
board  and  senior  management  oversight,  sound capital  assessment,  a  comprehensive  risk 
management system, monitoring and review, internal control review. Principle 2 states that 
supervisors should review and evaluate  banks'  internal  capital  adequacy determinants  and 
plans and also their ability to monitor and ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
Supervisors should also take necessary supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the 
outcome  of  this  process.   Pillar  Two  could  also  include  the  combination  of  on-site 
examinations or inspections; off-site review; discussions with bank management and review 
of external auditors' work (as long as it sufficiently focuses on necessary capital matters) and 
periodic reporting.45 Principle 3 states  that supervisors should require banks to operate above 
the  minimum  regulatory  capital  ratio  and  also  that  banks  hold  capital  in  excess  of  the 
minimum. Principle 4 states that supervisors should act at an early stage to prevent capital 
from falling below stipulated minimum levels.
Risk cycles are usually pro-cyclical due to misperception by banks and markets about how 
risks move over the period.46 There has been worry that the new Basel Accord on banks' 
capital standards could worsen this misperception by banks and markets – danger being that 
from 2006, banks would have to adjust their minimum capital requirements over time to align 
with changes in measured risk.47 As a result, banks' internal risk assessment would vary more 
than it should over the course of the cycle.48 
Pro cyclical problems were revealed following the collapse of Northern Rock where it was 
highlighted that it was complying with Basel capital requirements and had excess capital on 
the eve of its crash.49
Another  problem identified  with  Northern  Rock  was  that  it  had  high  leverage  –  relying 
heavily on debt to finance its assets.50
42  ibid
43  ibid
44 K Alexander,  'Corporate Governance and Basel II'' (paper presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, Russell Square on the 7th October 2004)
45 ibid
46  “Bubble and squeak”  The Economist  Sept 26th 2002 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=1336105>
47 ibid
48 ibid
49  S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ April 2009 Chart 3 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/a/fip/feddel/y2009iaprnv.4no.3.html (last visited 1st November 2010)
  Northern Rock had obtained approval from the Financial Services Authority to switch to Basel II advanced 
approach in order to calculate risk weights for its assets using the bank’s internal models. In December 2006, 
its capital ration was 11.6 under Basel I calculations but this jumped to 17.5 under Basel II. In June 2007, this 
had risen to 18.2%; for further information on this see S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for 
Banking Regulation?
50  ibid; Leverage is pro cyclical – being high during booms and low during downturns. Whilst some other 
institutions adjusted their balance sheets by raising new equity or selling assets to repay some debt, Northern 
rock did not reduce its debt; ibid.
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In response to Basel II’s shortcoming and since capital regulation contributes to the degree of 
economic downturns51, a complement of the rules on bank capital with rules on liquidity and 
leverage is proposed by Cociuba as a means of addressing the inadequacy of risk based capital 
measures in promoting the stability of the financial system.52
Furthermore,  counter  cyclical  regulatory  mechanisms  have  been  proposed  to  address  pro 
cyclical problems which have not been addressed by Basel II.53
Other  criticisms  directed  towards  Basel  2 include  supervisory discretion  – that  this  could 
result to regulatory capture, that it is excessively risk sensitive, that its capital formula is too 
prescriptive and complex and that it is not well-suited for 90% of the world's population.54 
Further, even though Basel 2, which is embodied in EU legislation55, sets out what should be 
considered under Pillars 2 and 3, it  does not provide directions to authorities of members 
states regarding what steps are to be taken in the cases involving non compliance.56 Such 
matters are to be decided at national level.57
Pillar  2 of the New Basel Accord ( Basel 2) however recognises the vital  role played by 
supervisors in the maintenance of adequate bank capitalisation58.With differences in legal and 
regulatory structures in different jurisdictions, the Basel Committee is conscious of the need 
to maintain adequate flexibility in the application of Pillar 2 in different jurisdictions.59 The 
Committee’s  intention  in  creating  Pillar  2  was  to  promote  and  support  a  more  thorough 
process aimed at internationally active banks to determine the actual capital held and to make 
this process subject to a more focused supervisory review than may have been the case.60 
Pillar  2,  both in its  first  principle  and in the consideration of several  more specific  risks, 
makes it clear that the prime responsibility is on banks to make this determination, taking 
account  of  their  circumstances.61 While  there  are  linkages  between  Pillar  1  and  2,  the 
Committee  sees  clear  differences  between  the  two.62 Pillar  1  represents  the  minimum 
regulatory  requirement  whereas  Pillar  2  expressly  recognises  that  banks  face  risks  not 
included under Pillar 1  (such as interest rate risks in the banking book and uncertainties in 
51  Since banks choose to reduce lending when capital is scarce
52  ibid; also see The Run on the Rock," House of Commons Treasury Committee, Fifth Report of Session 
2007–08, vol. 1, January 2008, pp. 14–15.
53  See M Brunnermeier and others,‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on 
the World Economy 11’, Preliminary Draft 2009 at pages 29-35
54 K Alexander,  'Corporate Governance and Basel II'  (paper presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, Russell Square on the 7th October 2004)
55  Through the Capital Requirements’ Directive
56  D Mayes and G Wood, ‘Lessons From the Northern Rock Episode’ (2008) at page 18 <http://economix.u-
paris10.fr/pdf/profs/Mayes-LESSONS-FROM-THE-NORTHERN-ROCK-EPISOD.pdf> (last visited 1st 
November 2010)
57  ibid
58  Bank for International Settlements, "Continued progress towards Basel II: Current sense of the Committee on 
the implementation of the supervisory review process – Pillar 2" 15th Jan 2004 < 
http://www.bis.org/press/p040115.htm> ( accessed 1st November 2010)
59 ibid
60 ibid
61 ibid
62See 'Continued progress towards Basel II : Current sense of the Committee on the implementation of the 
supervisory review process – Pillar 2'  15th Jan 2004 < http://www.bis.org/press/p040115.htm>
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measuring operational risks)63 and that many banks choose to operate at capital levels which 
are above those required under Pillar 1.64
Pillar 2 therefore expresses the Committee’s intention that internationally active banks should 
operate above the Pillar 1 minimum.65 This principle plays a vital role in the overall Capital 
Accord, and Pillar 2 provides considerable flexibility as to how that is achieved.66
The transparency requirements (Pillar 3) are not only designed to facilitate a complementary 
use  of  market  mechanisms  for  prudential  purposes  but  also  bolster  the  minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2).67 This derives from the 
assumption that well informed market participants will reward a risk-conscious management 
strategy  and  effective  risk  control  by  credit  institutions  in  their  investment  and  credit 
decisions and will correspondingly penalise riskier behaviour.68 Hence a greater incentive to 
monitor and efficiently manage risks should be stimulated within credit institutions.69
Having discussed the regulatory flaws in the Basel 1988 Accord, namely the fact that it was 
not risk-sensitive and the efforts of the Basel Committee in recognizing the calculation of 
regulatory capital which is premised partly on the risk models and systems of the individual 
banks, a shift from a wide command-and-control style of bank supervision to one whereby 
banks  are  still  required  to  regulate  capital,  albeit  according  to  their  own  models  can  be 
illustrated.
Meta – Risk Regulation
Regulation is often perceived as consisting of command and control strategies whereby the 
regulator imposes detailed rules with which the regulator monitors compliance.70 However, 
this type of regulatory strategy draws firms into regulatory processes and attempts to both 
influence and make use of firms internal risk management and control strategies71 As a result, 
supervision is not so much about the simple monitoring of firms' compliance with regulatory 
rules but more about evaluating and monitoring firms' awareness of the risks created by their 
business and of their internal controls.72
Meta risk regulation concerns the risk management of internal risk and being able to use the 
firms' own internal risk management systems to achieve regulatory objectives.73 The Basel II 
Capital  Accord  provides  an  example  of  the  operation  of  meta  regulation  in  that  bank 
capitalisation is not to be imposed externally by regulators but will be determined by a bank's 
own internal risk management models provided these models are considered by regulators to 
63  http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule2.en.php
64 See 'Continued progress towards Basel II : Current sense of the Committee on the implementation of the 
supervisory review process – Pillar 2'  
65 ibid
66 ibid
67 Deutsche Bundesbank, “Basel II: The Supervisory Review Process” 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_saeule3.en.php>
68  ibid
69  ibid
70J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice  (2006)  36
71 ibid
72 ibid
73 ibid p 37
8
be adequate.74 One major advantage of meta-risk regulation is that whilst Basel II builds in a 
second  pillar  of  a  supervisory  review  process  which  requires  regulators  to  ensure  the 
soundness of banks' internal risk rating processes, it has been suggested that there is scope for 
bank “gaming and manipulation” of ratings as regulators at best, have information that is not 
as much as that of banks whilst banks have access to private risk-relevant information that can 
be excluded from the rating system presented to regulators.75 
Most Recent Initiatives
On  the  21st February  2008,  a  paper  “Liquidity  Risk:  Management  and  Supervisory 
Challenges”,  was  issued  by  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  (BCBS).76 
Responding to the market turmoil which commenced in mid-2007, the Committee’s Working 
Group made  observations  on  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  liquidity  risk  management 
whenever confronted with crisis.77
On  the  11th April  2008,  the  report  delivered  by  the  Financial  Stability  Forum  (FSF), 
highlighted  five  recommendations  for  enhancing  the  resilience  of  markets  and  financial 
institutions.78 The five points include: strengthening prudential oversight of capital liquidity 
and  risk  management,  improving  transparency  and  valuation  procedures,  implementing 
changes to the role and uses of credit ratings; and fortifying the authorities’ responsiveness to 
risks.79
On the 16th April 2008, the Basel Committee unveiled some procedures which are aimed at 
making the banking system more resilient to shocks, namely:80 The enhancement of different 
aspects of Basel II whilst at the same time observing the need for timely implementation of 
the Basel II framework; the consolidation of global sound practice standards for managing 
liquidity  risk;  stimulating  efforts  to  strengthen  banks’  risk  management  and  supervisory 
practices  and;  improving  market  discipline  through  better  disclosure  and  valuation 
procedures.  
As  Basel  II  is  just  being  implemented  in  most  Basel  Committee  member  countries,  the 
importance of its implementation, since it reflects the types of risks banks are confronted with 
in  an  ever  increasing  market  oriented  intermediation  process,  has  been  emphasised.81 
Furthermore, some measures aimed at helping to ensure sufficient capital,  incorporate off-
balance sheet exposures more effectively and improve regulatory capital incentives will be 
introduced by the BCBS.82
74 ibid
75 Ibid p 39
76 B Gadanecz ‘Recent Initiatives by the Basel-based Committees and Groups’ June 2008 pg 81 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0806.pdf> The market turmoil revealed weaknesses in risk management 
at banking institutions and the Committee aims to release Pillar 2 guidelines which should help to consolidate 
risk management and supervisory practices, see ibid at pg 84 
77  ibid
78  See <http://www.fsforum.org>
79  ibid
80  Bank for International Settlements, „Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announces steps to 
strengthen the resilience of the banking system“ April 2008 <http://www.bis.org/press/p080416.htm> (last 
visited 1st November 2010)
81  See B Gadanecz ‘Recent Initiatives by the Basel-based Committees and Groups’ pg 82
82   ibid
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The BCBS aims to issue for consultation, in July 2008, global sound practice standards for the 
management and supervision of liquidity risk.83
CONCLUSION
The Basel Committee has come a long way from the days of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, 
which not only established minimum capital requirements for internationally active banks and 
was  able  to  increase  capital  levels  during  this  period,  but  was  actually  also  the  first 
international accord of such.84 Having dedicated more focus to the first and second pillars of 
Basel II, with the third receiving the least attention, Basel II could be criticised for not having 
accorded as much attention as is due to Pillar 3.
The  summer  of  2007  signalled  the  start  of  events  which  culminated  in  the  subsequent 
nationalisation of Northern Rock in the UK and the demise of Merill Lynch85 and Lehman 
Brothers. The unfolding of the mortgage crisis was revealed during this period and the crises 
deepened in 2007 and 2008 – resulting in turmoil for the global financial markets.
Some lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2007/08 indicated flaws in the following areas:86 
:
•  Market discipline :  This was ineffective  in constraining risk taking outside the banking 
sector
• An underestimation of the systemic importance of some non banks institutions
• That regulators (and supervisors) failed to take adequate account of the systemic risks
presented by the interaction between regulated and unregulated institutions activities (such as 
hedge funds), and markets.
According to Brunnermeier et al87 failures such as Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns  were  triggered  not  only  by  their  inability  to  transfer  their  liabilities  (funding 
illiquidity), but also their inability to sell mortgage products at “non-fire sale-prices” (market 
illiquidity). The extent to which the maturity of funding determines the risk of an asset is an 
important  lesson from the Crash of 2007/2008.88 A reason which was attributed to Northern 
Rock’s vulnerability was its excessive reliance on wholesale funds.89 “Wholesale funds are 
obtained from non financial corporations, money market mutual funds, foreign entities and 
other  financial  institutions.  Typically,  the  funds  are  raised  on  a  short-term basis  through 
instruments  such  as  certificates  of  deposit,  commercial  paper,  repurchase  agreements  and 
federal funds.”90
83  B Gadanecz ‘Recent Initiatives by the Basel-based Committees and Groups’ pg 84
84  M Saidenberg and T Schuermann, ‘The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research’ (2003) 
Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at pg 3
85   Merrill Lynch was taken over by the Bank of America.
86  See A Carvajal and others ‘The Perimenter of Financial Regulation’ (2009) SPN/09/07 at page 4 of 17 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0907.pdf >
87  See ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11’, 
Preliminary Draft 2009 at page 36
88  see ibid at viii
89  S Cociuba, ‘Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking Regulation?’ Chart 3 April 2009 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/a/fip/feddel/y2009iaprnv.4no.3.html 
90  ibid
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What Proportion of Risks are Actually Provided for by Basel II?
Hedge funds
The main purpose of Basel I and Basel II focuses round the incorporation of risks. As a 
starting  point,  it  needs  to  be  stated  that  risks  cannot  be  eliminated  –  they  can  only  be 
minimised. If risks were eliminated, then regulation would serve no purpose. Concerns remain 
over hedge funds as this is an area where regulators have limited jurisdiction. Many regulators 
do not authorise such funds and most of the administrators of these hedge funds are located 
offshore.91 In  March  2008,  the  Financial  Stability  Forum  (FSF)  during  its  19th meeting, 
considered  efforts  by  the  hedge  fund  industry  to  review  and  improve  sound  practices  – 
particularly  those  of  the  UK-based  Hedge Fund Working  Group and the  US-based  Asset 
Managers’ Committee and Investors’ Committee with the aim of increasing transparency and 
providing better risk management practices.92
Non bank financial institutions
Even though banks are unique in the sense of the extent of systemic risk they generate, such 
risks could also be triggered by a non bank financial institution. This could be illustrated by 
the effects  of  Enron’s collapse on the financial  markets.  It  could then be argued that  the 
disclosure of risk to market participants under Pillar 3 is not on its own sufficient, and that 
there is need for greater efforts to incorporate those risks attributed to non-bank institutions. 
91  FSA Annual Report  (2004/05) at page 22
The risks identified by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in relation to hedge funds can be summarised 
as  follows:  Serious market  disruption and erosion of  confidence  as  a  result  of  the failure  or  significant 
distress of a large and highly exposed hedge fund or, with greater probability, a cluster of medium sized 
hedge funds with significant and concentrated exposures; Liquidity disruption leading to disorderly markets 
as hedge funds make increasingly illiquid investments in particular markets and instruments whilst offering 
their investors the ability to withdraw their money more quickly. 
This could result in a significant liquidity mismatch and require hedge fund managers to dispose of 
assets very quickly, causing volatile and  potentially disorderly markets; insufficient reliable and comparable 
data is  available to regulators  which limits their  ability to make informed decisions about  risk and take 
proportionate  regulatory  action  to  mitigate  such  risk;  Control  issues  arise  as  the  trading  (rather  than 
management) background of many hedge fund managers, and their typical ownership structures, means that 
some managers do not have the right skills or incentives to create an effective control infrastructure. See 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/media/notes/bn008.shtml >
92  B Gadanecz ‘Recent Initiatives by the Basel-based Committees and Groups’ pg 87
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